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COMMENTARY
Defenses To Products Liability In Illinois Arising Out
of Plaintiff's Conduct
ANTHONY J. M. KISELIS*
INTRODUCTION

In Suvada v. White Motor Co.,' the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the rule of strict liability in tort for injuries' resulting from
the use of unreasonably dangerous products. The Suvada court delineated the basic ingredients of this cause of action as follows: a
plaintiff must show (1) that his injury was the direct and proximate
result of a condition of the product; (2) that the complained of
condition was an unreasonably dangerous one; and (3) that the
condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control.' The underlying theory of strict liability is that the burden
of catastrophic injuries arising from the use of defective products
should not be placed on innocent consumers but, rather, should be
borne by those who create the peril by placing defective items into
the stream of commerce.4
Although the term "strict liability" connotes absolute liability,
defenses to such a cause of action do exist. In Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Co., I the Illinois Supreme Court set forth two defenses, arising out of a plaintiff's conduct, to products liability actions
- misuse of a product and assumption of risk. At times, these
defenses have been misunderstood by Illinois courts. This comment
will focus upon the confusion arising out of defenses predicated on
plaintiff-conduct.
* J.D., Univ. of Chicago, 1977. Law Clerk to Hon. Glenn K. Seidenfeld, Illinois Appellate
Court, Second District.
1. 32 I1. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
2. Bodily injury as well as property damage is compensable in a products liability action.
Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187.
3. Id. at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
4. Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338 N.E.2d
857, 860 (1975). The doctrine does not apply to injuries caused by a defective product that
has not yet entered the "stream of commerce." Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 II. 2d 456,
465, 343 N.E.2d 465, 470 (1976). The doctrine defines the liability not only of manufacturers,
but also of wholesalers and retailers; this is so even where a package containing a defectively
manufactured product "pass[es] unopened" through a wholesaler's warehouse. Dunham v.
Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 11. 2d 339, 344, 247 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1969). Further, the
alleged defect can be a defect in manufacture or in design. Allen v. Kewanee Mach. &
Conveyor Co., 23 Ill. App. 3d 158, 162, 318 N.E.2d 696, 698-99 (1974).
5. 45 I1. 2d 418, 425-26, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309-10 (1970).
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MISUSE OF A PRODUCT

The defense of misuse has been defined as using a product in a
fashion that was neither intended by the manufacturer, nor reasonably foreseeable.' Thus, even the most abnormal use of a product will
not bar recovery if that abnormal use was reasonably foreseeable at
the time of manufacture.' The defense of misuse is not an affirmative defense; rather, it is a negation of an aspect of plaintiff's prima
facie case.' A products-liability plaintiff must prove, as part of his
prima facie case, that (a) the complained of product was unreasonably dangerous with respect to an intended or reasonably foreseeable
use9 and (b) that the plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by a
use of the product that was intended or reasonably foreseeable."'
Thus, the issue of misuse will arise "in connection with plaintiff's
proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition or in proximate causation or both.""
The Two Strand Analysis: Troszynski v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
In Troszynski v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 2 plaintiff received
a severe electrical shock when he touched an uninsulated wire in a
App. 3d 501, 503, 374 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1978).
6. Gallee v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 58 Ill.
7. Of course, such an abnormal use could give rise, independently, to the defense of
assumption of risk. See text accompanying notes 34 through 70 infra.
8. Gallee v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 501, 503, 374 N.E.2d 831, 834 (1978);
see also J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.79 (1st ed. 1977); Epstein, Products Liability
Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267, 284; Committee Comment,
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions 2d, Civil, No. 400.08 (1977 Supplement).
9. An excellent discussion of this aspect of a plaintiff's products liability case appears in
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.
2d 339, 342-43, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969):
Although the definitions of the term 'defect' in the context of products liability
law use varying language, all of them rest upon the common premise that those
products are defective which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the
manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature and intended function.
So, Chief Justice Traynor has suggested that a product is defective if it fails to
match the average quality of like products. (Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363 (1965).) The Restatement emphasizes the viewpoint of the consumer and concludes that a defect is a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which would be unreasonably dangerous to him. (Restatement, Torts (Second) 402A, comment g.) Dean Prosser has said that 'the product is to be regarded as defective if it is not safe for such
a use that can be expected to be made of it, and no warning is given.' (Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 826.)
10. In Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.
2d 7, 11, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974), the Illinois Supreme
Court explained the relationship between misuse and proximate cause:
In our judgment the liability of a manufacturer properly encompasses only those
individuals to whom injury from a defective product may reasonably be foreseen
and only those situations where the product is being used for the purpose for which
it was intended or for which it is reasonably foreseeable that it may be used.
11. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 431, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
12. 42 I1. App. 3d 925, 356 N.E.2d 926 (1976).
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meterbox, located in his backyard. At the time of the mishap, the
plaintiff was attempting to extricate some broken glass that had
fallen into the interior of the box. The plaintiff brought action
against the electric company predicated on products liability." The
jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and judgment was entered
accordingly. On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff
should be barred from recovery by reason of his misuse of the product. 4
Using a two-step analysis, the First District Appellate Court rejected this argument. It first agreed with the defendant that "the
intended use of a meterbox is for its employees to determine the
amount of electricity which has been used by the occupant of the
residence on which the meter has been attached."'" Conversely, it
might be said that the defendant obviously did not intend the meterbox to be a depository for broken glass. The appellate court then
discussed the second branch of the misuse test, the "foreseeability"
branch outlined by the Illinois Supreme Court in Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Co.'6 and Winnett v. Winnett. 7 The court explained
its understanding of this aspect of the Williams- Winnett test:
"[Tihis court must determine if the jury was presented sufficient
evidence to conclude that plaintiff sustained his injury while using
the product in a manner which was reasonable to foresee.""' The
appellate court concluded:
It is foreseeable that a member of the public would be injured if
dangerous, uninsulated wires were left in an accessible position
without adequate warning. The jury, therefore, easily could have
concluded that it was objectively reasonable for defendant to have
foreseen that a person would come into contact with the exposed
wires contained within the box. 9
The court further explained that:
In Illinois misuse of a product occurs when it is used for a purpose neither intended nor foreseeable. .

.

. We can only repeat

that it was the duty of the triers of fact to decide whether plaintiff's
use of the meterbox was foreseeable. Sufficient evidence was presented to support their determination (i.e., no misuse). Lewis v.
Stran Steel Corp. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128.111
13. Id.
14. Id. at 928, 356 N.E.2d at 929.
15. Id. at 930, 356 N.E.2d at 931.
16. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 (1970).
17. 57 Ill. 2d 7,11, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974).
18. Troszynski v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 42 II. App. 3d 925, 930, 356 N.E.2d 926,
931 (1976).
19. Id. at 931, 356 N.E.2d at 931.
20. Id. at 933, 356 N.E.2d at 933.
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The Missing Strand: Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hospital
The Troszynski opinion is an excellent example of a court paying
careful attention to both the "intended use" and the "reasonably
foreseeable use" strands of the misuse defense. In contrast, the court
that decided Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hospital2 ' apparently misunderstood the defense. In Stewart, the plaintiff had submitted to an
operation for the purpose of having a surgical pin inserted into the
tibia of his left leg. This pin subsequently broke while still lodged
within the plaintiff's body; the rupture of the pin led to complications and made further operations necessary. The plaintiff brought
action, predicated on a theory of products liability, against Central
Steel & Wire Co., the manufacturer of the pin, the Retzl Co., which
had shaped the pin for ultimate use, and the Von Solbrig Hospital,
Inc., an officer of which had actually implanted the pin in the plaintiff's body.
Plaintiff contended at trial that the pin had broken because it had
been defectively manufactured. Plaintiff's expert testified that the
pin in question was defective in that it contained foreign materials
and scratches. The expert suggested that but for these defects, the
pin would not have failed.2" The jury returned a verdict against
defendants Central Steel and Wire Co. and Von Solbrig Hospital
but in favor of defendant Retzl. The circuit court, however, entered
judgment n.o.v. in favor of Central and the hospital.
On appeal the defendants contended, inter alia, that the appellate court should affirm the lower court's judgment on the ground
of misuse by the plaintiff of the complained of product.' :' More specifically, the defendants argued that the pin in question was designed only to align and stabilize a fracture; it was not intended to
support the body's weight on an unhealed fracture outside of a cast.
The defendants further contended that since the plaintiff had admitted to walking about on the unhealed fracture without the assistance of a cast, he should be barred from recovery.
The defendants' argument, of course, dealt only with the
"intended use" aspect of the Williams-Winnett test. It failed to
even address the "reasonably foreseeable use" aspect of the same
test. The First District Appellate Court, nonetheless, accepted the
defendants' argument and held:
The uncontradicted testimony in the instant case was that the
[surgical] pin's intended purpose was to align and stabilize the
fracture but not to support the body's weight upon an unhealed
21.
22.
23.

24 Ill. App. 3d 599, 321 N.E.2d 428 (1974).
Id. at 601, 321 N.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 603, 321 N.E.2d at 431.
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fracture outside of a cast. The plaintiff in his own reply brief on
appeal admits that the [surgical] pin was not designed for this
latter purpose.
A break due to walking on the leg would constitute a misuse
of the product against the specific instructions of the plainiffs
doctor. A plaintiff may not recover under strict liability if his injury is the result of his misuse of the product."

The foregoing excerpt demonstrates that the Von Solbrig court
gave no heed to that aspect of the Williams opinion that requires,
as a predicate to a finding of misuse, a determination that the
abnormal use was not "reasonably foreseeable."" ' The Von Solbrig

court thus naively equated the quotidian meaning of "misuse" with
its special usage within the context of products liability.,'
Under the Von Solbrig court's broad interpretation of "misuse,"
a manufacturer of an unreasonably dangerous product could escape
liability merely by showing that the plaintiff's use of the product,
although entirely foreseeable, was not the use for which the product
had been designed. This would be so even though the plaintiffs
injury may have been entirely foreseeable and despite the fact that
24. Id. at 603-04, 321 N.E.2d at 432.
25. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 (1970). See
also Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 57 Ill. 2d 94, 102, 311 N.E.2d 128, 133 (1974).
26. Despite the Von Solbrig court's failure to comprehend the nature of the misuse defense, that tribunal probably reached the correct result in the case before it. The plaintiff in
Von Solbrig had not alleged a design defect, but had contented himself with charging the
manufacturer with a defect in production (i.e., the supposed inclusion of foreign materials
and the supposed scratches). The opinion suggests that the evidence at trial indicated either
(1) that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the pin had been defective (in that it had
contained foreign materials and scratches) when it left the manufacturer's control; and/or (2)
that the plaintiff had not proven causation-in-fact since the evidence further indicated that
a pin without the alleged defects would probably have broken anyway under the circumstances presented.
27. The principal policy consideration underlying the doctrine of products liability is
probably the "loss spreading" or "social insurance" consideration. "The purpose of such
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by
the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.'' Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57,
63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962). See also Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-24 (1960).
In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965), the Illinois
Supreme Court set forth two additional policy considerations. The court asserted that the
public interest in human life and health "demands all the protection the law can give. .. "
Id. This consideration might be referred to as the "deterrent" factor. The court also pointed
out that, "The manufacturer solicits and invites the use of his product by packaging advertising or otherwise, representing to the public that it is safe and suitable for use." Id. The court
reasoned that, "Having thus induced use of the product, the law will impose liability for the
damage it causes." Id. This last consideration might be referred to as the "warranty" consideration.
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the plaintiff may have been in the exercise of the highest degree of
care for his own safety. Such a result would frustrate the policy
27
considerations that inform the law of strict products liability.
In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co.,"' the Illinois Supreme
Court pointed out that "a greater degree of culpability on the part
of a plaintiff will be required in order to bar recovery in some types
of action than in others."" The court held that simple contributory
negligence, which is a bar in Illinois to a tort action based on negligence, does not involve a sufficient degree of fault to bar recovery
in a products liability action. 3 1 The court then held that "misuse"
by a plaintiff did involve sufficient culpability as to bar such a
recovery .3 The court, however, defined "misuse" as "use . . . for a
purpose neither intended nor foreseeable (objectively reasonable) by
the defendant. ' 32 The Von Solbrig formulation, which ignores the
foreseeability strand of the foregoing definition, would thus radically lower the degree of plaintiff culpability that will defeat a products liability action. Such a result would frustrate the policy objectives that underlie the doctrine of strict products liability.*'
ASSUMPTION OF RISK

The Restatement of Torts (Second), section 496A, delineates four
categories of assumption of risk: (1) where the plaintiff, by express
consent, 34 has agreed to relieve the defendant of some duty owed to
him; (2) where, because of the relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant, there exists an implied-in-law consent, by plaintiff, to a lesser standard of care on the defendant's part;35 (3) where
28. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
29. Id. at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309. Thus, simple contributory negligence will bar a tort
action founded on simple negligence. See, e.g., Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 230, 234
N.E.2d 790, 792 (1968). Simple contributory negligence, however, will not bar an action
founded on wilful and wanton misconduct, an aggravated form of negligence. See, e.g., Beverly Bank v. Penn Central Co., 21 111. App. 3d 77, 82, 315 N.E.2d 110, 114-15 (1974). In such
an action contributory wilful and wanton misconduct is necessary to preclude recovery. See,
e.g., Zank v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R., 17 Ill. 2d 473, 476, 161 N.E.2d 848, 849
(1959).
30. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I1. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E. 2d 305, 309 (1970).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See note 27 supra.
34. It is, of course, possible for a person to express assent by non-verbal conduct that
unequivocally evinces such assent. See, e.g., Voit Rubber Co. v. Peoria Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 280 Ill. App. 14, 22 (1935); see also Memory v. Niepert, 131 Ill. 623, 631, 23 N.E. 431,
433 (1890); Lundin v. Egyptian Construction Co., 29 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1063-64, 331 N.E.2d
208, 211 (1975).
35. The second type of assumption of risk arises where "the plaintiff voluntarily enters
into some relation with the defendant, with the knowledge that the defendant will not protect
him against the risk." See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971) Ihereinafter
cited as PROSSERI; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965). The only rela-
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plaintiff, aware of a risk already created by the defendant, proceeds
to voluntarily encounter it; and (4) that form of assumption of risk
which is a defense to a cause of action sounding in strict tort liability,"6 where the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably proceeds to
encounter a known danger. All but the third category of assumption
of risk are available as defenses to negligence actions in Illinois;
however, only the first and fourth are potentially important as defenses in products liability litigation.
Assumption of Risk By Express Consent
1.

General Application

The classic form of assumption of risk is assumption by express
consent. Dean Prosser described this form of assumption of risk as
follows:
In its simplest and primary sense, assumption of risk means that
the plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his
chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone. The situation is then the same as
tionship in Illinois that will give rise to this type of assumption of risk is the employment
relationship. See, e.g., Mack v. Davis, 76 I1. App. 2d 88, 97-98, 221 N.E.2d 121, 126 (1966);
Kelly v. Fletcher-Merna Coop. Grain Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 419, 425-27, 173 N.E.2d 855, 858-59
(1961). This last form of assumption of risk is, however, rarely seen in the case law because
the overwhelming majority of employment relationships are governed by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1 - 138.26 (1977). Even in employment
relationships that are not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, the defense is available only where the employee knew and appreciated, or at least should have known and
appreciated, the peril created by his employer's negligent conduct. See Mack v. Davis, 76
Ill. App. 2d 88, 97, 221 N.E.2d 121, 126 (1966). Thus, an employee does not, by entering into
the employment relationship, assume the risk of his employer's undisclosed or non-obvious
negligence. Indeed, an express agreement by an employee to assume the risk of undisclosed,
non-obvious perils created by the employer's negligence is unenforceable in Illinois. See
Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake Forest, 415 Ill. 453, 460, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1953).
Assumption of risk by entering into an employment relationship has no analogue in the
jurisprudence of products liability.
36. In the period before strict products liability, this type of assumption of risk was
available in some jurisdictions in "wild animal" cases. In the leading case of Muller v.
McKesson, 73 N.Y. 195, 201, 29 Am. Rep. 123, 126 (1878), the New York Court of Appeals
held as follows:
[If a person with full knowledge of the evil propensities of an animal wantonly
excites him, or voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himself in the way of such an
animal, he would be adjudged to have brought the injury upon himself, and ought
not to be entitled to recover. In such a case it cannot be said, in a legal sense, that
the keeping of the animal, which is the gravamen of the offense, produced the
injury.
This type of assumption of risk was also a defense in some jurisdictions to suits based on
"abnormally dangerous things and activities." See, e.g., Robison v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2,
4-6, 394 P.2d 876, 877-78 (1964). See also PROSSER, supra note 35, § 79; Anderson v. Anderson,
259 Minn. 412, 416, 107 N.W.2d 647, 649-50 (1961).
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where the plaintiff consents to the infliction of what would otherwise be an intentional tort, except that the consent is to run the
risk of unintended injury, to take a chance, rather than a matter
of the greater certainty of intended harm .3

Assumption of risk by express consent is recognized as a defense to
a negligence action in Illinois, at least where the consent is given in
a contractual context and is supported by consideration." An example of this defense can be found in Morrow v. Auto Championship
Racing Association, Inc.39 In Morrow, the plaintiff contracted with
defendant to race his automobile in stock car races conducted by the
Association. The contract provided that plaintiff would be insured
against injury or death resulting from a racing accident. However,
the contract also contained a clause in which the plaintiff released
the defendant Association from all "liability, claims, actions, and
possible causes of action" arising from any damage or injury sustained while plaintiff was "in, about, (or) en route into and out of'
defendant's premises.' 0
Plaintiff was injured when another race car went out of control
and careened into him. In a subsequent negligence action against
the Association, a $55,000 judgment was entered for plaintiff. The
First District Appellate Court, in reversing, held that the plaintiff
had by express consent assumed the risk of injury flowing from
defendant's negligence. The court explained:
37. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 60; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 496B (1965).
38. See, e.g., Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake Forest, 415 Ill. 453, 460-62, 114 N.E.2d
721, 725 (1953). The Illinois Supreme Court has twice confirmed the availability of this
defense in negligence actions in the last ten years. Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 533-34, 248
N.E.2d 111, 114 (1969); Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 149, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1978).
There are no Illinois cases dealing with the availability of the defense of assumption of risk
by express consent where no consideration supported the consent, i.e., in a non-contractual
context. The defense is, however, probably available even outside the matrix of contract for
two reasons. First, in Barrett v. Fritz, 42 11. 2d 529, 248 N.E.2d 111 (1969), the Illinois
Supreme Court strongly suggested that this defense would be available, even outside a contractual context. In Barrett, the supreme court explicitly declined an invitation to extend the
scope of the assumption of risk defense in Illinois. In doing so, however, the court did state:
Evaluation of the intrinsic merits of the concept of assumption of risk indicates
that no expansion of that concept in Illinois law is warranted. The action of the trial
court in giving the instruction on assumption of risk here, where there was neither
express consent nor an employment or contractual relationship, over plaintiff's
persistent objection preserved in the record, constituted reversible error. (Emphasis
added.)
Id. at 536, 248 N.E.2d at 115.
Second, "consent" is usually a defense to an intentional tort. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R.
v. Allen, 39 I11.
205, 209 (1866); see also Heller v. Howard, 11 Ill.
App. 554, 560 (1882). A
fortiori, it should be available as a defense to a negligent or strict liability tort.
39. 8 Ill.
App. 3d 682, 291 N.E.2d 30 (1972).
40. Id. at 683, 291 N.E.2d at 31.
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Therefore, we hold that an agreement between a participant in
and a promoter of a stock car race, whereby the former assumes
the risk of participating and releases the latter from claims due to
the latter's negligence, is not void as against the public policy of
this state [and will be enforced so as to bar recovery]."
Express Consent as a Defense in Products Liability Cases

2.
a.

Consent to Known Defects

The Illinois Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue of
whether assumption of risk by express consent should or should not
be a defense to a products liability action. Indeed, there are very few
cases" in the United States that deal with the availability of this
defense in a strict liability action. Prosser discussed this rarely invoked defense as follows:
Assumption of risk without contributory negligence, which turns
upon consent of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of his obligation, has seldom appeared in products liability cases; but there can
be no doubt that the defense is valid in a proper case. Thus when
the plaintiff, bitten by a mad dog, consents to inoculation with the
defendant's vaccine, with full knowledge of the risk involved, it
was held that there was no liability for his death.'3
It appears that the defense of express consent to specific defects
would be available in Illinois in a proper case. In Dunham v. Vaugh
& Bushnell Manufacturing Co.," the Illinois Supreme Court held
that "defective products" are products "which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected
in light of their nature and intended function." 45 If the ultimate
consumer is informed by the manufacturer of a defect in the product
and if the ultimate consumer, by express consent, agrees to relieve
the manufacturer of liability in the matter, the consumer can hardly
be heard to say at a later date that the product failed to perform
"in the manner reasonably to be expected." The Dunham court also
referred, with approbation, to the Restatement of Torts (Second),
section 402A, comment g, for the proposition that "a defect is a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer which would
be unreasonably dangerous to him." 4 Again, if the manufacturer
41. Id. at 686, 291 N.E.2d at 33.
42. But see Schafer v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1953); Weils v. Ace Rentals, Inc.,
249 Iowa 510, 87 N.W.2d 314 (1958); Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d
720 (1954).
43. PRossER, supra note 27, § 102. See also Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products
Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122; 133-34 (1961).
44. 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
45. Id. at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403.
46. Id. at 343, 247 N.E.2d at 403.
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apprises an ultimate consumer of the existence of a defect in a
product and if the consumer relieves the manufacturer of liability
for injuries resulting from the defect, the consumer could not contend at a later date that the complained of defect was not a
'contemplated" one.
b.

Consent to Unknown Defects

The foregoing analysis deals only with the disclosure of specific,
known defects. The same analysis would seem applicable in a proper case to an express consent by a consumer to assume the risk of
injury arising from unknown defects in a product. To illustrate this
last statement, assume the following hypothetical: General Motors
manufactures a car which is sold, a month later, by a franchised
General Motors dealer to Mr. Consumer. Although cars of this make
and model carry a manufacturer's suggested retail price of $6,000,
the manufacturer also suggests that the retailer sell the car for
$5,000 if the purchaser signs a statement that provides, in bold
print: "I, the Purchaser, in consideration of $1,000, release the manufacturer of this car, and all other persons in the chain of distribution, from all liability arising out of personal injury to myself or
damage to my property arising as a natural consequence of any
defect, other than those caused by the manufacturer's negligence,
that may inhere in this car." Assume also that the manufacturer
will charge the dealer $1,000 less for any car sold by it pursuant to
such a release; assume further that $1,000 is adequate consideration
for this release. Two weeks later, Mr. Consumer and his friend, Mr.
Third, are involved in an accident because of a defect in the powerbrake system of the car. Mr. Consumer and Mr. Third subsequently
sue General Motors in a products liability action. Would the Illinois
courts honor such an exculpatory clause in such an action?
The relevant cases indicate that an exculpatory clause will be
upheld "unless it would be against the settled public policy of the
State to do so" or unless "there is something in the social relationship of the parties militating against upholding the agreement."' 7
The public policy of the State "is to be found in its constitution and
its statutes, and when cases arise concerning matters upon which
they are silent, then in its judicial decisions and the constant practices of government officials. 18 Nothing in the Illinois Constitution
47. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake Forest, 415 Ill. 453, 460, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725
(1953). See also Morrow v. Auto Championship Racing Ass'n, 8 I1. App. 3d 682, 685, 291
N.E.2d 30, 32 (1972); Erickson v. Wagon Wheel Enterprises, Inc., 101 Ill. App. 2d 296, 30102, 242 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1968); Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises, 48 Ill. App. 2d 344, 348,
199 N.E.2d 280, 281 (1964).
48. Schnackenberg v. Towle, 4 I1. 2d 561, 565, 123 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1954).
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prohibits an exculpatory clause in a sales contract; nor does any
statute outlaw such a clause. 9 Neither is such a clause contrary to
50
the settled decisional law of the State.
Several Illinois cases, however, have disapproved of attempts to
limit strict tort liability by "fine print" exculpatory clauses.5 No
case, however, has squarely dealt with an exculpatory clause that
(a) was actually negotiated at arms-length by the parties and (b)
where the consumer, for adequate consideration, voluntarily divested himself of some right of action against the manufacturer.52
The relevant cases5 3 suggest that where these two factors are pres49. Indeed, Section 2-316(3) of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code (ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
26, § 2-316(3) (1977)) provides, in the analagous disclaimer of warranty situation that:
"[Ulnless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language which in common understanding
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty; . . ." The Illinois Uniform Commercial Code Comment (ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 26, § 2-316) illustrates the meaning of the foregoing provision by reference to the case of
Pokrajac v. Wade Motors, Inc., 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954). In Pokrajac, the plaintiff
bought a car "as is." The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the disclaimer of all warranties
barred suit by him against the seller of the car for injuries arising from defective brakes.
See also ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 121 ,2, § 262L (1977) which requires a car dealer to bear a
portion of the cost of repairs required during the first thirty days after delivery, if the car is
less than four years old. This same section of the Consumer Fraud Act also provides, however,
that a consumer may by contract divest himself of this statutory right. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 80, § 91 (1977) which provides that exculpatory clauses in leases of real property are "void
as against public policy and wholly unenforceable." Cf. also ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.2a
(1977), which outlaws releases from liability as a condition of medical treatment.
50. Exculpatory clauses in two types of contractual relationships are contrary to the
settled case law of the State. First, an exculpatory clause by which a common carrier purports
to relieve itself of some duty of care owed to its patrons is void because contrary to public
policy. See, e.g., Checkley v. Illinois Central R.R., 257 Ill. 491, 494-95, 100 N.E. 942, 943-44
(1913). Similarly, the Illinois courts will not enforce a clause in an employment contract,
whereby an employer purports to relieve himself of the consequences to his employees of his
undisclosed and non-obvious negligence. See, e.g., Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank of Lake Forest,
415 IIl. 453, 460, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1953); see also Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens
Bldgs., 20 Il1. App. 2d 1, 10-33, 155 N.E.2d 372, 376-88 (1958), for an extensive discussion of
this matter.
51. See, e.g., Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 63 Ill. App. 3d 985, 990-91, 380 N.E.2d
819, 823-24 (1978); see also Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 30, 214 N.E.2d
347, 352-53 (1966). The foregoing two cases, however, dealt with situations where the defendant had sought, in an essentially unilateral fashion, to define its liability. Neither case
reached the issue of the validity of non-adhesive exculpatory agreements.
52. In Hennigsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), a well known
disclaimer of warranty case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an exculpatory clause
in a contract for the sale of an automobile was void because contrary to public policy. The
clause was a "fine print" recitation that did not even bear the caption "warranty" or "limited
warranty." Also, the dealer had failed to call the plaintiff's attention to the clause at the time
of purchase. The instant hypothetical is quite different from the Hennigsen case. Further,
the Hennigsen court found that this type of disclaimer (i.e., of all implied warranties) was
made by all automobile manufacturers. Hence, a prospective car buyer either had to assent
to the disclaimer or forgo buying a new car. Id. at 403, 161 A.2d at 94. In the profferred
hypothetical, Mr. Consumer was not put to such a Hobson's choice.
53. See note 47 supra.
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ent, as in the instant hypothetical, the exculpatory clause will be
upheld.5'
Voluntarily Proceeding to Encounter a Known Risk
The third type of assumption of risk 55 arises where "the plaintiff,
aware of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant,
proceeds voluntarily to encounter it. . . . "5 Unlike assumption of
risk by express consent where the plaintiff relieves the defendant of
a duty of care before the defendant breaches the duty, this defense
relieves a defendant of liability flowing from negligent conduct occurring prior to or contemporaneous with the plaintiffs liability
relieving action. In 1969, the Illinois Supreme Court specifically
declined an opportunity to make this type of assumption of risk
available as a defense in negligence actions. 5 This type of assumption of risk is not available in products liability actions, but it is
closely related to the fourth type of assumption of risk, where plaintiff both voluntarily and unreasonably proceeds to encounter a
known risk.
PlaintiffActs Unreasonablyin Voluntarily Proceedingto Encounter
a Known Danger
Assumption of risk is a defense in a products liability action where
the plaintiff acts unreasonably in "voluntarily proceeding to encounter a known danger."" Thus, this form of assumption of risk,
which will bar recovery in a products liability action, exists only
where plaintiff's conduct is also objectively unreasonable, i.e., only
54. It need scarcely be said that General Motors would not have this defense available to
it in the suit by Mr. Third. This is so because Mr. Third in no way consented to assume the
risk of faulty General Motors workmanship or of a faulty General Motors design.
55. The second type of assumption of risk is discussed in note 35 supra.
56. PaossER, supra note 27, 68.
57. Barrett v. Fritz, 42 ll. 2d 529, 534-37, 248 N.E.2d 111, 114-15 (1969).
One Illinois appellate court opinion of forty years vintage does suggest that this defense
should be available in negligence actions. See Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 I1.
App. 225, 239, 14 N.E.2d 879, 885 (1st Dist. 1938). The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
expressly disapproved the Campion view in the Barrett case.
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, § 402A, comment n (1965), quoted with approval in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 423, 261 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1970). The
First District Appellate Court adverted to the "unreasonableness" ingredient of assumption
of risk for purposes of products liability in Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 Il1
App. 3d 981, 989-90, 360 N.E.2d 440, 446-47 (1977).
The Second District Appellate Court referred to the existence of this sometimes forgotten
aspect of assumption of risk for purposes of products liability in Coty v. U.S. Slicing Mach.
Co., 58 Ill.
App. 3d 237, 244-45, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1377-78 (1978).
For an excellent discussion of this point, see Johnson v. Clark Equipment Co., 274 Or. 403,
409-16, 547 P.2d 132, 138-42 (1976). See also Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485,
492-93 (5th Cir. 1972); Devaney v. Sarno, 125 N.J. Super. 414, 418-19, 311 A.2d 208, 210
(1973).
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where his conduct also constitutes contributory negligence. Prosser
describes the assumption of risk that will bar recovery in a products
liability suit as occurring where the third type of assumption of risk
(defined as voluntarily proceeding to encounter a known danger)
and contributory negligence overlap." This also seems to be the view
of those few Illinois opinions that have carefully considered the
issue. 0
It should be noted that Illinois jurisprudence has long recognized
that a person can voluntarily proceed to encounter a known peril
and yet be free of all contributory negligence. "1 This last situation
would occur whenever it would be "reasonable" to encounter a
known danger. Thus, a man who drives a vehicle equipped with
brakes which he knows to be defective "voluntarily proceeds to encounter a known danger;" however, if he drives such a vehicle with
all due caution in order to transport a man suffering from a heart
attack to a hospital in the knowledge that the victim would surely
perish otherwise, his action is probably not unreasonable. Stated
another way, the driver of the vehicle, under these circumstances,
could not be faulted by a "reasonable person" for having chosen to
encounter the known peril.
1. Application of Assumption of Risk as a Defense in Illinois
Products Liability Cases
a.

Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Maufacturing Co."2

In Doran, plaintiff was injured when a railroad car moved forward
while he was lying underneath the car attempting to force open a
circular gate on the bottom of the car. Plaintiff argued that he had
59. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 102.
60. Coty v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 58 Il. App. 3d 237, 244-45, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1377-78
(1978); Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 981, 989-90, 360 N.E.2d 440,
446-47 (1977). See also Scott v. Dreiss & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 111. App. 3d 971, 990, 326 N.E.2d
74, 87 (1975).
61. The cases recognize that where an employee sues his employer, the employee may be
charged with the second type of assumption of risk, discussed in note 35 supra, even where it
is shown that he was free from all contributory negligence, i.e., where the evidence indicates
that he conformed his conduct to the standard of the "reasonable man."
Every person suing for a personal injury must show that he was in the exercise
of ordinary care and caution for his own safety, so that the question of contributory
negligence may be involved in every case; but an employee may have assumed a
risk by virtue of his employment, or by continuing in such employment with knowledge of the defect and danger, and if he is injured thereby, although in the exercise
of the highest degree of care and caution, and without any negligence,yet he cannot
recover. (Emphasis added.)
Chicago & Eastern R.R. v. Heerey, 203 11. 492, 502, 68 N.E. 74, 77 (1903). See also Kelly v.
Fletcher-Merna Coop. Co., 29 Ill. App. 2d 419, 425-26, 173 N.E.2d 855, 858-59 (1961); Stahl
v. Dow, 332 I1. App. 233, 241, 74 N.E.2d 907, 910 (1947).
62. 45 11. App. 3d 981, 360 N.E.2d 440 (1977).
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been required to place himself in this precarious position because
the defendants had defectively designed the railroad car in question
so that workmen were often required to crawl under the car in order
to disengage the underside-covering. The defendants argued, inter
alia, that the plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter of law
because he had, by his own admission, voluntarily exposed himself
to a known danger. The trial court granted summary judgment for
both defendants.
The First District Appellate Court reversed, holding that although the plaintiff did voluntarily proceed to encounter a known
danger, it could not be said that his actions in so doing were
"unreasonable" as a matter of law. The court explained:
The danger here, as contended by defendants, was in the act of
plaintiff going beneath the car without ascertaining whether it
could be moved. The record indicates that plaintiff acted voluntarily, and it appears that he should have known that the car might
be moved. There remains the crucial question, however, as to
whether he acted unreasonably in going under the car and, from
our examination of the record, it appears to us that the matrix of
logic does not compel the acceptance of the conclusion that the
facts here are susceptible of the single inference
that plaintiff
63
unreasonably encountered a known danger.
One of the stated reasons for the court's determination that the
plaintiff did not act "unreasonably" as a matter of law was that he
had been told by his supervisor to "clean the cars on that track."'64
The court clearly recognized that a workman does not act
"unreasonably" (i.e., does not become guilty of contributory negligence) as a matter of law whenever he fails to "walk off" the job
after discovering some negligent act or omission on his employer's
part, which exposes him to some peril.
The court's holding in this regard has a sound basis in judicial
precedent.6 5 It also has a sound basis in common experience. Although it is true that ordinary care is not the entire measure of
63. Id. at 989-90, 360 N.E.2d at 447 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 990, 360 N.E.2d at 447.
65. See, e.g., Scott v. Driess & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 971, 990, 326 N.E.2d 74,
87 (1975), where the First District Appellate Court stated: "In situations where the nature of
plaintiff's employment requires exposure to certain hazards, it would be a non sequitur of
the policy considerations of strict tort liability to say that plaintiff has voluntarily and
unreasonably assumed such hazards by the mere acceptance of his employment."
Similarly, the Second District Appellate Court, in Coty v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 58 Ill.
App. 3d 237, 245, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1377-78 (1978), stated: "One does not voluntarily and
unreasonably assume the hazard of using a defectively designed product which is unreasonably dangerous by mere acceptance of employment ..
"
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reasonable care, the two are usually co-terminous.1 Hence, it would
be somewhat ironic to say that it is per se unreasonable for a workman to stay on the job after discovering some negligent, perilproducing act or omission on his employer's part, in view of the fact
that the overwhelming majority of workmen do not instantly abandon their employment under these circumstances.
b.

Prince v. Galis Manufacturing Co. 7

In Galis, a miner was injured when a wrench flew off a roof-bolter
he was using to implant bolts in the ceiling of a mine. Plaintiff sued
the manufacturer in strict liability charging that the Galis roofbolter was unreasonably dangerous because it did not contain an
auger retainer which would have prevented the wrench from dislocating in the above described manner.
The defendant-manufacturer defended against plaintiffs action
on the ground that the plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter
of law because he continued on the job, aware of the fact that the
roof-bolter he had been given to work with did not have a retainer.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on
these facts. However, the facts indicate that the plaintiff had made
out a prima facie case of products liability, 8 and they do not indicate that the plaintiffs conduct in remaining on the job, after becoming aware of the fact that his employer had given him a defective tool to work with, was unreasonable as a matter of law. A jury
in seeking to determine the question of the reasonablenessof plaintiffs conduct would have to consider how great a danger was posed
by the defective tool and what the consequences would have been
for the plaintiff if he had refused to work with it.
The Third District Appellate Court affirmed on the ground that
the plaintiff must have assumed the risk since he was admittedly
aware of some danger. The court paid no attention to whether the
plaintiff's failure to refuse to use the tendered roof-bolter was
66. The relationship between these two cognate standards was analyzed by Judge Learned
Hand in the following manner:
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the general practice of the
calling the standard of proper diligence; we have indeed given some currency to the
notion ourselves. . . . Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.
The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
67. 58 I1. App. 3d 1056, 374 N.E.2d 1318 (1978).
68. A products liability plaintiff must show (1) that his injury was the direct and proximate result of a condition of the product; (2) that the complained of condition rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous; and (3) that the condition existed at the time the product
left the manufacturer's control. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d
182, 188 (1965); see also text accompanying notes 1 through 3 supra.
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"unreasonable" under the circumstances. The Third District's opinion can be interpreted to mean that a workman assumes the risk as
a matter of law for purposes of products liability whenever he continues in an employment situation which requires him to use a
defective tool or machine, at least where it can be shown that the
workman was aware of the defect. If this is the Third District's view
of matters, it is incorrect." It is more likely that the Third District
was simply unaware of the "unreasonableness" ingredient in assumption of risk for purposes of products liability. 0
Hopefully, the trial and appellate courts in Illinois will pay more
attention in the future to that aspect of the Williams opinion that
quotes the Restatement of Torts (Second), section 402A, comment
n:
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter
a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section [402A] as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect
and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
of the product and is injured by it, he
unreasonably to make use
7
is barred from recovery. '
CONCLUSION

The tripartite" assumption of risk defense in products liability
represents a considered judgment as to the degree of plaintiffculpability that should bar recovery in a strict liability tort action.
The Illinois cases, however, rarely discuss the "unreasonableness"
69. See Johnson v. Clark Equipment Co., 274 Or. 403, 409-16, 547 P.2d 132, 138-42 (1976);
see also Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 836, 454 P.2d 205, 208 (1969); Coty v.
U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 237, 244-45, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1377-78 (1978).
70. Cf. Fore v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 346, 287 N.E.2d 526 (1972), where the
Third District Appellate Court, in a products liability action, implicitly held that assumption
of risk for purposes of products liability is the same thing as assumption of risk in the old,
master-servant cases. This is, of course, incorrect. See cases cited in note 69 supra.
71. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 423, 261 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1970) (emphasis added).
72. In Johnson v. Clark Equipment Co., 274 Or. 403, 409-10, 547 P.2d 132, 138 (1976), the
Oregon Supreme Court held as follows:
The concept of assumption of risk in a products liability case differs somewhat
from the traditional tort doctrine of assumption of risk.. . . In contrast to the more
traditional defense which includes only two elements - subjective knowledge and
voluntary encounter - Comment n [of the Restatement of Torts (Second), § 402
A (1965)] sets forth three elements which must be shown before the plaintiff can
be barred from recovery [in products liability]. The defendant must show, first,
that the plaintiff himself actually knew and appreciated the particular risk or
danger created by the defect; second, that plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk
while realizing the danger; and, third, that plaintiff's decision to voluntarily encounter the known risk was unreasonable. If the trier of fact finds that any one of
these elements did not exist in a particular case, the defense cannot be sustained.
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element of this defense. As a consequence, a number of cases have
incorrectly ruled against plaintiffs on the issue of assumption of
risk.73 The "forgotten" ingredient of this defense, unreasonableness,
merits more attention than it has received.
The defense of misuse is grounded on considerations of proximate
causation. It reflects the view that a manufacturer should not be
liable for injuries arising from a use that was not foreseeable at the
time of manufacture.74 A redefinition of this defense to mean simply
a use that was not subjectively intended would, of course, be an
invitation to manufacturers to pay no attention to dangers that
might arise from the foreseeable, but unintended, uses to which
their products may be put. It would also severely undercut the "loss
spreading" effect of strict products liability. The present formulation, a use that was neither intended by the manufacturer nor reasonably foreseeable by it, avoids these consequences. In dealing with
this defense, the courts should bear in mind that the defense consists of two elements, "intended use" and "reasonably foreseeable
use;" and that the question of foreseeability is preeminently one for
the jury's determination.75
73. See, e.g., Prince v. Galis Mfg. Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 374 N.E.2d 1318 (1978),
discussed in text accompanying notes 66 through 69 supra.
74. In Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 11, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1974), the Illinois Supreme
Court expressed the following view:
In our judgment the liability of a manufacturer [in strict products liability]
properly encompasses only those individuals to whom injury from a defective product may reasonably be foreseen and only those situations where the product is being
used for the purpose for which it was intended or for which it is reasonably foreseeable that it may be used.
75. Id. at 13, 310 N.E.2d at 5.
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